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We analyze dynamically optimal eutrophication management using two controls, targeted
ﬁshing and reduction of external nutrient loads. Fishing removes nutrients from the water
ecosystem, and the size of the ﬁsh stock also inﬂuences eutrophication through food web
effects and other mechanisms. We show that ﬁsheries have a role to play in cost-efﬁcient
water quality management in combination with external load reductions. Our numerical
application considers phosphorus driven eutrophication, agricultural phosphorus abatement
and ﬁsheries targeted on cyprinids on a coastal bay in the Baltic Sea. The socially and
privately optimal intensity of ﬁshing efforts, phosphorus abatement and the resulting water
quality are inﬂuenced by damages, revenues and costs. Furthermore, we show that the link
between cyprinid ﬁsh stock and water quality, and the form of the ﬁshing industry — sole
owner or open access — have joint dynamics that lead to very different outcomes. Aweak
link between cyprinid stock and water quality is associated with socially optimal stock
close to its maximum sustainable yield. This maximizes phosphorus removal. With a strong
link, socially optimal stock and phosphorus removal are low. Coincidentally, open-access
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ﬁshing sometimes yields socially desirable outcome automatically — a market failure in
industry structure may counteract eutrophication.
Keywords: Dynamic optimization; eutrophication; ﬁsheries; phosphorus; agriculture.
1. Introduction
In freshwater ecosystems and coastal marine areas, eutrophication is a widespread
phenomenon that adversely affects the ecosystem services which these areas can
provide. Eutrophication is mainly caused by excessive anthropogenic nutrient
release (Smith 2003; Diaz and Rosenberg 2008). Highly eutrophic lakes, rivers or
marine areas are characterized by high nutrient concentrations, high phytoplankton
biomass — often including nuisance blooms of phytoplankton — and oxygen
deﬁciency in their deeper waters (Horne and Goldman 1994). These effects cause
cascading changes in the structure and function of the ecosystem in its entirety.
Fishing also alters aquatic ecosystems directly by removing ﬁsh and indirectly by
inducing changes in the systems’ food-webs. Typically, ﬁsheries ﬁrst deplete the
stocks of large predatory ﬁsh, whereupon decreased predation pressure enables
increases in secondary consumers, such as zooplanktivorous species, and increases
feeding on herbivorous zooplankton (Pauly et al. 1998; Christensen 2014). In eu-
trophic European freshwater lakes high biomasses of cyprinid ﬁsh recirculate nutri-
ents back to the water column through excretion and bioturbation (i.e., reworking the
bottom sediment). Anthropogenic nutrient loading and changes in the ﬁsh community
thus jointly inﬂuence ecosystems’ primary production, that is, phytoplankton growth.
Nutrient loading has a direct effect on the nutrient concentration of a waterbody,
while ﬁsh and ﬁsheries inﬂuence it indirectly. At least three major mechanisms of
indirect inﬂuence have been identiﬁed: effects on food webs through changes in
zooplankton communities; recycling of nutrients back to the water column; and
permanent removal of nutrients in the harvested ﬁsh biomass. Socially optimal
eutrophication management should consider not only nutrient loading from land
but simultaneously also the impacts of ﬁsheries and ﬁsh stocks on the ecosystem.
The basic efﬁciency condition equates marginal costs of control at all sources of
pollution, evaluated at the receptor point (Baumol and Oates 1988). We argue that
due to their effect on water quality, ﬁsheries should be included in the framework
of efﬁcient eutrophication management. Traditionally, the economics of ﬁsheries
has focused on over-ﬁshing and over-capitalization triggered by open access to ﬁsh
stocks. The literature has promoted efﬁciency by recommending restrictions on
overall ﬁshing effort in the form of transferable or ﬁxed individual quotas, taxes,
TACs, capital constraints, etc. (see, e.g., Clark 2010; Costello et al. 2008; Nielsen
et al. 2012). In the present context, socially optimal ﬁsheries management may
A. Iho et al.
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well call for more intensive ﬁshing. This is particular the case if dense populations
of zooplankton-feeding or sediment-reworking ﬁsh species — low in market
value — maintain or even accelerate eutrophication. In other words, environmental
considerations point to a reversal of the “normal” ﬁsheries problem.
There are studies linking nutrient loading and production capacity of com-
mercial ﬁsheries. One of the earliest considers fertilizing lakes to increase pro-
ductivity (Hasler and Einsele 1948). A study more closely related to ours is by
Knowler et al. (2001) who link ﬁsh stock dynamics in open-access ﬁsheries to
ambient nutrient pollution and to a regime shift in the water ecosystem. Their
analysis highlights the ﬁsheries’ beneﬁts from pollution abatement. Our analysis
considers ﬁsheries as part of eutrophication management.
Economic literature on eutrophication management has focused on controlling
external nutrient loads to surface waters. This orientation seemingly ignores the fact
that, by and large, the society controls the focus and intensity of ﬁsheries. In actual
water protection, large-scale ﬁsheries have often been used for ecosystem restoration
(Sass et al. 2006; Nürnberg et al. 2012). There have also been attempts to include
existing recreational ﬁsheries in water quality management. Yet, the literature con-
tains no studies that combine ﬁsheries of different scales in dynamic water quality
models that allow for control of external nutrient loading. Eutrophication is a stock
pollution problem, as deﬁned by Keeler et al. (1972). To our knowledge, analyses of
optimal eutrophication management have thus far not considered the option of
inﬂuencing the level of the pollution stock directly (even though this practical option
is sometimes discussed, see e.g., Mäler et al. 2003). Effectively, ﬁsheries provide the
regulator with an option to inﬂuence the stock, in addition to controlling external
sources. We contribute to literature by incorporating both management options in our
optimal ﬁsheries–eutrophication management framework.
Our main goal is to examine whether, and how intensively, the society should
utilize targeted ﬁsheries in eutrophication management; and how such activities
should be combined with external nutrient control. To answer these questions, we
develop a dynamic optimization model for eutrophication management through the
reduction of external loads and through targeted ﬁshing. We apply the model to
cyprinid ﬁsheries in the coastal bay of Mynälahti, South-West Finland, and to
agricultural phosphorus abatement at its watershed. To keep the logic of the in-
terplay of ﬁsheries and external abatement as clear as possible, we conﬁne the
model to a single nutrient: phosphorus.1
1In most fresh water ecosystems phosphorus is the critical nutrient for algae growth (Schindler 2012).
Including nitrogen to our model would add a new dimension but would not change the basic
outcomes qualitatively.
The Role of Fisheries in Optimal Eutrophication Management
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Our results show that ﬁsheries have a role in water quality management — in
combination with external load reductions. The results quantify the importance of
the yet poorly understood food web effects on optimal policies. If the cyprinid ﬁsh
stock has limited or non-existent food web effects, the socially optimal policy is to
have the ﬁsh stock close to its maximum biological sustainable yield. Doing so
maximizes nutrient removal with the catch. As the negative effect of the ﬁsh stock
on water quality increases, it becomes socially optimal to reduce the stocks to ever-
lower levels, even though this increases the costs and decreases the annual
phosphorus removal with the harvest. Due to the trade-off in phosphorus removal
and the ﬁsh stock effect, the structure of ﬁsheries industry affects the social welfare
associated with the unregulated case. Open access tends to drive stocks to lower
levels which in our case may be socially desirable. Over-ﬁshing may thus be
beneﬁcial for eutrophication management. The result is akin to a monopoly being
more cautious in extracting non-renewable resources: market failure in industry
structure counteracts another.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
model which is then parametrized in the third section. The results are presented in
the fourth section and the ﬁnal section discusses the policy implications and
avenues for further research.
2. Model
Assume a waterbody that is a source of recreational beneﬁts and proﬁts from
single-species ﬁsheries. The former depends on water quality, which is inﬂuenced
by the stocks of (total) phosphorus and cyprinid ﬁsh in the waterbody. The
phosphorus stock is driven by external loading from agriculture, which can be
abated at a cost, and by the phosphorus removed with the harvested ﬁsh biomass.
We consider three alternative decision makers: (1) a proﬁt-maximizing indi-
vidual ﬁsher operating in an open-access ﬁshery, (2) a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁsher
operating as the sole owner of the ﬁsh stock and (3) a social planner who takes into
account proﬁts from ﬁsheries and the non-market values of water quality. All
decision makers are price takers.
2.1. Socially optimal ﬁsheries and phosphorus abatement
We begin from the social planner’s dynamic optimization problem. A social
planner maximizes the discounted stream of proﬁts from ﬁsheries ðf Þ and proﬁts
from agriculture ðaÞ minus the environmental damages affecting recreation (DÞ:
max
zt , St
X1
t¼0
β t½f ðXt, StÞ þ aðztÞ  DðQt,XtÞ, ð1Þ
A. Iho et al.
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s.t.
Qtþ1 ¼ ð1 ÞQt þ q  zt  ðXt  StÞ, ð2Þ
Xtþ1  FðStÞ ¼ St þ rSt 1
St
K
 
: ð3Þ
The choice variables are stock escapement ðStÞ and external phosphorus abatement
ðztÞ. Stock escapement refers to the biomass of ﬁsh surviving into the season
following the harvest while Xt refers to biomass before the harvest. β is the
discount factor. In each period, the fraction  of the phosphorus stock (QtÞ decays
via water outﬂow and sedimentation [Eq. (2)].2 External phosphorus loading
(q  ztÞ adds to the next period’s stock, whereas ﬁsheries remove the quantity
ðXt  StÞ from the stock,  denoting the phosphorus concentration of the catch.
The growth of the ﬁsh stock is a function of the escapement St [Eq. (3)]. Intrinsic
growth rate is denoted by r and K is the carrying capacity of the ﬁsh stock.3
The proﬁts from ﬁsheries are modeled following Laukkanen (2003):
f ¼ pðXt  StÞ  γ ln
Xt
St
 
, ð4Þ
where p is the market price of ﬁsh, Xt the ﬁsh stock in the beginning of the season
and St the escapement; their difference represents the harvest. The marginal cost of
catching one more ﬁsh is =x, where x is the size of the ﬁsh stock at any given time.
The total harvesting cost of the period is thus γ lnðXt=StÞ.4
The proﬁts from agriculture (with zero abatement) are normalized to zero.
Effectively, this transforms the planner’s problem into one of minimizing abate-
ment costs:
a ¼ 
1
2
αz2t , ð5Þ
where the marginal abatement cost is αz.
2The model treats phosphorus sedimentation in the same way as riverine outﬂow. It thus does not
take into account the possibility of sediments losing their capability of binding phosphorus after the
phosphorus stock has reached some threshold level. See, e.g., (Carpenter 2005; Mäler et al. 2003) for
implications of non-convexities in controlling external phosphorus loads.
3Birth rate and mortality are implicit in the growth function which captures the net growth rate of the
stock. With St ¼ K the net growth rate is zero; i.e., the birth rate and natural mortality are equal. For
simplicity, the ﬁsh growth is not affected by the phosphorus stock. In the sensitivity analysis, we will
vary the intrinsic growth rate (rÞ and the carrying capacity (KÞ to see how they would affect the
optimal solutions.
4The effort required to harvest one unit is 1=x. The integral over ﬁshing costs during the annual
harvest is γ
R X
S
1
x dx ¼ γðlnðXÞ  lnðSÞÞ ¼ γ ln XS .
The Role of Fisheries in Optimal Eutrophication Management
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The environmental damage depends linearly on water quality:
D ¼  þ η lnðQct Þ  ! 1
Xt
K
  
, ð6Þ
where  is the constant marginal damage.5 The expression in square brackets
yields a scalar valued usability index used in Finland until 2008. The lower the
value, the higher the water quality. The index is a sum of two terms. The ﬁrst one,
(þ η lnðQct ÞÞ, captures the effect of phosphorus stock and the second one,
! 1 XtK
  
, the effect of the ﬁsh stock on water quality. Steady state harvesting
and the associated ﬁsh stock thus enter the damage function in two ways: (i)
Harvesting lowers the phosphorus stock ðQÞ, as expressed in Eq. (2) and (ii)
Lowering the ﬁsh stock ðXÞ from its carrying capacity level ðKÞ may inﬂuence
water quality. Henceforth, we will call the latter as the cyprinid effect. It is the
effect the existing ﬁsh stock has on water quality via recycling of sediment
nutrients and via changes in food web.
The cyprinid effect depends on the deviation of the actual stock size from its
potential maximum.
The effect is scaled by a parameter !. If the ﬁsh stock is at its carrying capacity,
the cyprinid effect is zero regardless of the value of ! and the water quality is
determined solely by the phosphorus stock. Also, if ! ¼ 0, the ﬁsh stock as such
does not affect eutrophication, regardless of the stock size. With positive values of
!, the effect is determined by the ratio of the ﬁsh stock and the carrying capacity.
The lower the stock, the stronger the positive effect on water quality. The theo-
retical maximum effect — equal to ! — is achieved when Xt ¼ 0, that is, when the
entire ﬁsh stock is removed.
Because of its complexity and limited understanding, the cyprinid effect is
modeled in a very general way. The only assumption made in the theoretical model
is that ! obtains weakly positive values, i.e., !  0, indicating neutral to detri-
mental effect on the water quality. While a larger stock of some ﬁsh species,
particularly predatory ﬁsh, has been theorized to have positive effects of water
quality (Søndergaard et al. 1997; Skov and Nilsson 2007), the relationship between
cyprinid ﬁsh and water quality has repeatedly been proven to be negative (e.g.,
Horppila and Kairesalo 1990; Breukelaar et al. 1994; Hansson et al. 1998;
Horppila et al. 1998). A numerical application in Section 3.1 will present all key
results for a wide range of values of !.
5Equation 6 conditions damage to phosphorus concentration (Qct ), which is directly obtainable from
the stock of phosphorus: Qct ¼ QtVol, where Vol is the volume of the waterbody. We will use the terms
phosphorus stock and concentration interchangeably.
A. Iho et al.
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Assuming positive abatement and harvesting choices, their optimality condi-
tions are (the complete set of optimality conditions and their derivation is presented
in the Appendix):
αz ¼ βDQ
1 βð1 Þ , ð7Þ
p γ
S
¼ βF 0ðSÞ p γ
X
 
 DX
h i
 βð1 βF
0ðSÞÞ
1 βð1 Þ DQ, ð8Þ
where DQ ¼ ηQc is marginal damage of phosphorus in the waterbody and DX ¼ !K
marginal damage of the ﬁsh stock. Condition 7 states that at the optimal steady
state — with positive abatement and ﬁshing effort — the marginal abatement cost
(αzÞ equals the shadow value of the phosphorus stock, discounted back one period.
This condition is a classic result in stock pollution problems.
Equation (8) captures the optimality conditions of harvesting when ﬁsh stock’s
water quality effects are acknowledged. It indicates that the steady-state escape-
ment, which is determined by harvesting, must equalize the marginal proﬁts
ðp γSÞ with a set of different marginal effects from an extra unit of escapement.
The ﬁrst marginal effect on the right-hand side (βF 0ðSÞðp γXÞÞ is the dis-
counted value of increased escapement. The marginal increase in escapement,
(F 0ðSÞÞ, is multiplied by the marginal revenue of an extra unit, discounted back one
period, βðp γXÞ.6 If there were no damages associated with either the ﬁsh stock or
phosphorus stock (i.e., DX ¼ DQ ¼ 0Þ, this would be the only term on the right-
hand side of Eq. (8) and the optimality conditions would coincide with the classic
conditions obtained in the case of sole ownership.
The second marginal effect, (βF 0ðSÞDXÞ, depends on the marginal damage
(DXÞ the ﬁsh stock causes to water quality. Above, we justiﬁed that for cyprinid
ﬁsh !  0 and therefore DX  0. The term would thus be (weakly) negative,
decreasing the optimal escapement (increasing harvesting efforts) and reducing the
steady-state ﬁsh stock.
The third term, ðβð1βF 0ðSÞÞ1βð1Þ DQÞ, captures the effect of marginal escapement on
phosphorus removal and thereby on environmental damage. The marginal damage
of the phosphorus stock is positive (DQ > 0Þ. The sign of the third term thus
depends on the magnitude of βF 0ðSÞ. Depending on escapement ðSÞ, a marginal
change in escapement level may either increase or decrease the following period’s
steady-state harvest, that is, the amount of phosphorus removed. Harvesting
6Note that the current-period marginal proﬁt increases in escapement: the higher the stock when we
stop harvesting (i.e., the higher the escapement), the smaller the term γS. The value of the left-hand
side of the equation thus asymptotically approaches p γX from below.
The Role of Fisheries in Optimal Eutrophication Management
1650031-7
W
at
er
 E
co
ns
. P
ol
ic
y 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.
co
m
by
 4
6.
30
.1
32
.2
04
 o
n 
11
/2
4/
16
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
(and thus phosphorus removal) is higher, the closer the ﬁsheries operates to the
biological maximum sustainable yield (MSY).
2.2. Private optima
Private ﬁsheries do not take into account the eutrophication caused by the phos-
phorus stock or the effects that ﬁsheries and ﬁsh stocks have on water quality. We
consider two forms of private ﬁsheries: open access and sole ownership. The latter
has a perfect control of all individual (or one representative) ﬁshing units it
comprises. Therefore, it has a perfect control over the development of the ﬁsh
stock. Its maximization problem becomes
max
St
X1
t¼0
β t p Xt  Stð Þ  γ ln
Xt
St
  
s.t.
Xtþ1 ¼ FðStÞ:
The privately optimal steady state escapement becomes:
p γ
S
¼ βF 0 Sð Þ p γ
FðSÞ
 
: ð9Þ
On the other hand, a private ﬁsher operating in an open-access ﬁshery does not
take the stock development into account as it is beyond the control of any indi-
vidual. At the optimum, ﬁshing efforts are set at the level where the unit cost of
effort is equal to price: γX ¼ p. Assuming identical ﬁshing units, the open-access
escapement is deﬁned by:
p ¼ γ
S
: ð10Þ
The ﬁrst order conditions illustrate the presence of two externalities in the model:
Private decision makers do not take damage due to eutrophication into account in
their optimization problems and open-access ﬁsheries do not take into account the
development of the ﬁsh stock. In the model, all three types of decision makers will
thus generate different outcomes regarding proﬁts, environmental damage and
social welfare.
3. Numerical Application and Optimal Policies
Coastal waters are particularly vulnerable to the effects of ﬁshing and other an-
thropogenic perturbations (Botsford et al. 1997). Accordingly, we have chosen to
apply our model to a relatively small and shallow bay, Mynälahti, in the
A. Iho et al.
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Archipelago Sea, South-West Finland. The size of the bay is 8,060 hectares, mean
depth about 3.5m and water volume 282 million cubic meters. The turnover of
water is fairly rapid as the total discharge of the three rivers ﬂowing into the bay is
about 177 million cubic meters. The long-term average (during July–September)
phosphorus concentration has been 36.3g=L.7 The bulk of external phosphorus
loading originates from non-point sources, mainly agriculture. The ﬁeld acreage of
the basin is about 17,700 hectares. Commercial ﬁshery in the bay is intensive.
The parametrization is illustrative. Many of the parameters are at least partly
based on expert evaluations — primarily due to a lack of data.8 The main purposes
of the numerical application are to provide a quantitative feel for the model and to
pinpoint the parameters most critical for our results. The application thus helps
steer future research efforts. Detailed presentation of each parameter is given in the
Appendix.
Table 1 collects and presents the parameter values used in the application.
Table 2 presents the annual harvesting levels, associated escapement, external
phosphorus abatement and phosphorus concentration at the steady state for our
parametrization, using a cyprinid effect parameter ! ¼ 1. The second column from
the left presents the social optimum, the third column the values associated with
the sole owner’s optimum and the column on the right the open-access ﬁsheries
optimum.
Table 2 quantiﬁes the theoretical results discussed earlier. Our model encom-
passes two market failures: the tragedy of commons from open-access ﬁsheries and
the phosphorus externality that reduces the recreational value of the surface water.
The social planner takes both externalities into account, the sole owner internalizes
the open-access problem but ignores the phosphorus externality; and the open-
access ﬁsheries fail to take into account either of the market failures. Annual
escapement is lowest at the social planner’s optimum (at 309.8 tons); the associated
harvesting is 79.9 tons. Note that the open-access harvesting levels are higher than
this, 87.2 tons. That is, the open-access ﬁsheries remove more phosphorus from the
waterbody than the socially optimal level indicates. The difference is that the social
planner also takes into account the negative effect of the ﬁsh stock itself and
therefore keeps the ﬁsh stock permanently at a very low level. The social planner’s
optimal abatement is 0.47 tons and the associated phosphorus concentration of the
waterbody is 30:0g=L.
7The values are based on unpublished data of the Finnish Environment Institute.
8We cannot, for instance, observe the ﬁsh stock sizes or the food web effect on water quality. The
phosphorus dynamics of the bay are modeled in the simplest possible way; we consider a single ﬁsh
species that combines two cyprinid ﬁsh, bream and roach.
The Role of Fisheries in Optimal Eutrophication Management
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The sole owner harvests markedly less, the annual harvest being 58.1 tons (the
associated escapement is 1,292.6 tons). The phosphorus concentration is
32.5g=L. Industry proﬁts are EUR 3,014.
The open-access ﬁsheries operate more intensively than the sole owner, with an
annual harvest of 87.2 tons and escapement of 1,150 tons. This has two effects on
Table 1. Fixed Parameter Values in Simulations
Parameter/Function Value Unit
i Interest rate 0.03 —
β Discount factor β ¼ 11þi 0.97 —
Transition of the phosphorus stock: Qtþ1 ¼ ð1 ÞQt þ q  zt  ðXt  StÞ
 Decay rate of the phosphorus stock 0.89 —
q Baseline loading 8.6 ton
 Phosphorus concentration in cyprinid ﬁsh 0.75 per cent
Transition of the ﬁsh population: Xtþ1  FðStÞ ¼ St þ rStð1 StK Þ
r Intrinsic growth rate 0.325 —
K Carrying capacity of the ﬁsh stock 1,500 ton
Fishery proﬁts: f ¼ pðXt  StÞ  γ lnðXtSt Þ
p Market price for ﬁsh 400 EUR/ton
γ Cost parameter for harvesting 460,000 EUR
Proﬁts from agriculture: a ¼ a  12 αz2t
a Normalized proﬁts with zero abatement 0 EUR
α Cost parameter for phosphorus abatement 113,600 EUR/ton
Damage function: D ¼  þ η lnðQct Þ  ! 1 XtK
 	 

 Value of the marginal environmental damage 317,400 EUR
 Intercept of the phosphorus water quality function 2:5 —
η Slope of the phosphorus water quality function 1.3 —
! Cyprinid ﬁsh stock’s direct effect on water quality 1 —
Table 2. Socially and Privately Optimal Steady State Phosphorus Abatement and
Concentration, and Fisheries and Fish Stock
Social Optimum Sole Owner Open Access
Annual Harvest ðX  SÞ 79.9 58.1 87.2
Escapement ðSÞ 309.8 1,292.6 1,150
Phosphorus Abatement ðzÞ 0.47 0 0
Phosphorus Stock ðQÞ 8.47 9.17 8.93
Phosphorus Concentration ðQcÞ 30.0 32.5 31.7
Proﬁts ðf þ aÞ 85, 937 3,014 1,259
Damage ðDÞ 375,234 611,723 576,513
Welfare ðWÞ 461, 170 608, 709 575, 254
A. Iho et al.
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water quality. First, as harvesting is higher, phosphorus removal is higher too.
Second, lower cyprinid ﬁsh stock decreases the detrimental cyprinid effect on
water quality. The effects can be seen in the phosphorus concentration and the
environmental damage, both of which are lower under optimum for open-access
ﬁsheries than that for the sole owner. The values for phosphorus concentration and
environmental damage are higher than under the social optimum because there is
no abatement under either of the two other optima. Open-access proﬁts are lower
than sole owner’s but are not zero even though the marginal proﬁts are: with a
ﬁxed price, each unit harvested before the marginal unit yields positive proﬁts.
Overall, the structure of the ﬁshing industry — whether based on open access or
sole ownership — may inﬂuence in opposite directions in terms of the two market
failures. The sole owner corrects the traditional over-ﬁshing problem of the open-
access ﬁsheries. On the other hand, in our base case open-access ﬁsheries are more
favorable for the environment. The results could be reversed depending on whether
open-access ﬁsheries result in lower harvesting (and escapement) levels. This is
typically the case in commercial ﬁsheries around the world (see, e.g., Costello
et al. 2008). If the harvesting levels were lower, the total effects on water quality
would depend on the relative weights of the nutrient removal effect and the effect
that the stock itself has on water quality. That is, it is not a general result that open-
access ﬁsheries are better for water quality. It is, however, a general result that
open-access and sole-ownership ﬁsheries differ in the optimal harvesting and es-
capement levels they generate, and that they therefore have differing effects on
water quality.
3.1. Numerical comparative statics
The base case results provide a snap-shot of our model. Additional insights can be
obtained by varying the important (and uncertain) parameters. Table 3 presents the
Table 3. Numerical Comparative Analysis— Social Optima for ! < ~! and ! > ~! where ~! ¼ 0:375
!  p K r
! < ~! ! > ~! ! < ~! ! > ~! ! < ~! ! > ~! ! < ~! ! > ~! ! < ~! ! > ~!
Harvesting ðX  SÞ þ  þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ
Escapement ðSÞ    þ  þ þ þ þ þ
Fishing Effort ðEÞ þ þ þ  þ  þ  þ þ
Abatement ðzÞ þ  þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ
Phosphorus
Stock ðQÞ
 þ        
Welfare ðWÞ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ 
The Role of Fisheries in Optimal Eutrophication Management
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directions of changes of social optima as the values of key parameters are in-
creased. We give the values for ! greater and smaller than ~!  0:375. This is the
level of ! associated with a social optimum at the biological MSYof the ﬁsh stock.
With some parameters, the changes in social optima are different on the two sides
of the MSY.
Increases in the carrying capacity and growth rate have rather obvious effects on
socially optimal choices. Both increase optimal harvesting and escapement, as well
as abatement. The latter is caused by the concave form of our environmental
damage function: improving water quality increases the optimal marginal abate-
ment cost. Naturally, these combined decrease the optimal phosphorus stock.
Higher carrying capacity increases (decreases) ﬁshing efforts if the initial es-
capement level is initially above (below) the MSY level. The result is numeric and
does not have a clear intuition: For ! > ~!, the effect of increased harvesting levels
are offset by the increase in the escapement level. For initial values above the MSY,
the effort level increases even though both escapement and harvesting increase.
Let us then look in closer detail at some of the most interesting variations that
increasing!,  and p prompt in either the social optima or in optima of all three cases:
social, open access and the sole owner. We ﬁrst explore how the cyprinid effect
parameter! affects socially optimal ﬁsheries and external phosphorus control.9 Both
panels of Fig. 1 depict ! on the horizontal axes. Avalue of zero means that the stock
has no direct effect on water quality, a value of 2 means that it has a substantial effect
[see Eq. (6)]. The vertical dashed line marks the level of ! for which the socially
optimal steady state harvesting coincides with the biological MSY.
The left panel in Fig. 1 depicts harvesting and escapement levels in the socially
optimal steady state (in tons per year). If the ﬁsh stock does not inﬂuence the water
quality directly (i.e., ! ¼ 0), the socially optimal annual harvesting is somewhat
over 100 tons and the escapement is about 1,000 tons. As expected, the optimal
escapement decreases steadily as w increases. The annual harvesting ﬁrst increases
and then starts decreasing as the escapement falls closer to MSY and eventually
below it. The lower the escapement, the more expensive it becomes to harvest a
given amount of ﬁsh. Moreover, for landings below the MSY, phosphorus removal
starts decreasing with !. The social planner is thus willing to incur both higher
ﬁshery costs and lower phosphorus removal to keep the stock — that is itself the
more harmful, the higher ! is — on a lower level permanently. If only phosphorus
removal matters for the environment ð! ¼ 0Þ, the social planner considers only net
revenues from ﬁsheries and phosphorus removal.
9Both private decision makers’ optima are insensitive toward variations in water quality, hence the
focus on the social planner’s optima only.
A. Iho et al.
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The right panel in Fig. 1 presents how the variation in ! affects optimal ﬁshing
efforts and external phosphorus abatement. The steadily rising dashed line denotes
the ﬁshing efforts, and the dotted curve rising before and descending after MSY the
optimal abatement. If ! ¼ 0 and there is thus no direct water quality effect, the
abatement is about 0.48 tons (out of the initial 8.6 tons). The left panel shows that a
higher ! is associated with a lower steady state escapement. As the effort required
to catch ﬁsh is inversely linked to escapement, the optimal effort increases with !.
The property of the ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing optimal abatement
reﬂects the fact that the link between the general usability classiﬁcation and phos-
phorus concentration is concave, and that the damage is linear in water quality. This
makes the damage functions concave in phosphorus concentration. Therefore, the
marginal damage decreases as the phosphorus concentration increases.10 If both
links were linear, the optimal abatement would not vary with !. If the damage
function were convex, the optimal abatement would ﬁrst decrease, then increase.
Let us then look at the effect of phosphorus concentration in ﬁsh tissue on
socially optimal escapement and harvesting (private optima are insensitive toward
variations in phosphorus concentration). Because the effects depend on whether we
are initially below or above the biological MSY, we consider two alternative
cyprinid effects: ! ¼ 0:2 and ! ¼ 1.
10The economics literature typically assumes convex damage functions, although there are also
examples of damage function speciﬁcation that are concave at least for a certain range of the variables
(see, e.g., Lichtenberg and Zilberman 1986; Kahn 1998). In our model, the concavity stems from the
links between the general usability classiﬁcation and phosphorus concentration. The main results of
our analysis would not be qualitatively changed if we were to use a linear or convex damage
speciﬁcation.
Figure 1. Socially Optimal Steady States for Alternative Direct Water Quality Effects of the Cyp-
rinid Fish Stock (!Þ
The Role of Fisheries in Optimal Eutrophication Management
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Figure 2 presents the socially optimal escapement and harvesting levels. As the
phosphorus concentration in ﬁsh tissue increases, each harvested unit of ﬁsh
improves water quality more. Other things being equal, the optimal harvesting
level increases. If the escapement is initially above the MSY level (Fig. 2, left
panel), higher harvesting is associated with lower escapement levels. If the es-
capement level is initially below the MSY (Fig. 2, right panel), both harvesting and
escapement increase as the phosphorus concentration in ﬁsh tissue increases. The
effect illustrates the trade-off between the two effects that ﬁsheries have on water
quality: the phosphorus removal effect gets stronger with increasing  while the
cyprinid effect remains the same. Therefore, the social planner allows the es-
capement to change to increase the harvests and phosphorus removal.
Finally, we vary the long-term price of ﬁsh. We examine how price changes
affect privately and socially optimal escapement (Fig. 3) and ﬁshing efforts
(Fig. 4). Social optima are evaluated at ! ¼ 0:2 and ! ¼ 1.
The dotted curve in Fig. 3 denotes the optimal steady-state escapement for the
sole owner, the dashed curve the open-access optima and the solid curves the social
optima for ! ¼ 0:2 and ! ¼ 1. The biological MSY is marked with a horizontal,
dashed line. The price at which the open-access steady-state escapement coincides
with the MSY is about 620 EUR/ton.
Price variation illustrates how the traditional ﬁsheries externality related to open
access starts to manifest itself as the market price increases. Uncoordinated ﬁshing
efforts increase rapidly with price and lower the associated escapement levels. A
ﬁshery that operates on the basis of sole ownership never allows the escapement to
fall below the MSY, thus avoiding over-capitalization of the industry and over-
exploitation of the ﬁsh stock.
Figure 2. Socially Optimal Harvesting and Escapement for Alternative Phosphorus Concentration of
Harvested Fish  for ! ¼ 0.2 and for ! ¼ 1
A. Iho et al.
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The increasing price may have opposite effects on privately and socially optimal
ﬁsheries. As the price increases, the increased proﬁts from ﬁsheries start weighing
more in the social planner’s optimal solution: a higher price increases the socially
optimal escapement if it is initially below the MSY (the case with ! ¼ 1Þ. Both
sole owner and open-access optima start investing increasing effort in ﬁsheries as
the increasing price makes it proﬁtable to harvest even from lower stocks (see
also Fig. 4). We see that for a price of about 1,000 EUR/ton the open-access
escapement would coincide with the social optimum associated with ! ¼ 1. At that
price — by coincidence — one externality has partly removed the other. Even
Figure 3. Optimal Steady State Escapement for Alternative Fish Prices, for ! ¼ 0:2 and ! ¼ 1
Figure 4. Optimal Steady State Fishing Effort for Alternative Prices, for ! ¼ 0:2 and for ! ¼ 1
The Role of Fisheries in Optimal Eutrophication Management
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though the open-access escapement is identical to the social optimum, private
optima do not contain any abatement of external phosphorus loading from
agriculture.
Figure 4 illustrates how the optimal ﬁshing efforts develop as the price
increases. The solid curves denote the socially optimal effort levels associated with
the two values of !, the dotted curve the level under sole owner access and the
dashed curve the levels of the open-access ﬁsheries.
The graph is a good illustration of the two sources of welfare which the social
planner has to consider in the objective function [Eq. (1)]. The price increase
makes it socially proﬁtable to allow the escapement to rise (if initially below MSY)
in order to increase the annual harvesting. There is a trade-off whereby the im-
pairment in water quality from the higher escapement and increased sales revenues
from ﬁsheries is partly offset by the increased phosphorus removal due to higher
harvesting levels. If initially below (above) MSY, the price increase results in
social planner putting less (more) effort into ﬁsheries because harvesting occurs
under higher (lower) escapement levels, as shown in Fig. 3. Both private decision
makers increase their effort as the price increases.
Both Figs. 3 and 4 highlight the differences between open-access and sole
ownership for any given price level. These differences are well-established: Open-
access leads to higher overall effort levels and lower stock levels (see, e.g.,
Bjørndal et al. 2004).
The numerical comparative statics highlight the interplay of two externalities,
the social planner’s efforts to curtail them and the differences in the extent to which
they are generated by private ﬁshers’ optimal solutions depending on the structure
of the ﬁshery. Fisheries operating under open-access and sole ownership obtain
different total catches and sustain different levels of ﬁsh stocks, thereby differen-
tiating their contributions to water quality.
4. Discussion
In recent decades, biomanipulation, often in the form of selective ﬁshing, has been
undertaken in many temperate lakes, but the results have indicated variable suc-
cess. In general, successful restoration of lakes with biomanipulation seems to
require simultaneous abatement of external loading. Biomanipulation has two
major effects on a water ecosystem: it removes nutrients with the ﬁsh tissue and it
changes the stock(s) of the targeted ﬁsh. The stock changes affect water quality via
the food web. The ecological impacts of nutrient abatement (known as bottom-up
control) and consumer species (top-down control) have been widely analyzed and
A. Iho et al.
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disputed. It has been suggested that both forms of control are effective in both seas
and freshwater lakes.
In this paper, we have developed a stylized dynamic optimization model for
water quality management that combines external abatement and ﬁsheries to
maximize social welfare. We consider three alternative cases, with decision makers
considering only their own proﬁts, proﬁts from the ﬁshery as a whole, or both
water quality and the ﬁshery as a whole. There are thus two market failures
incorporated in our model: (potential) over-ﬁshing resulting from open access and
eutrophication.
We applied our model to a relatively closed coastal bay, Mynälahti, South-West
Finland. We showed that optimal policies consist of both abatement of agricultural
loads and ﬁsheries targeting cyprinids. Two drivers proved extremely important.
First, the effect that the ﬁsh stock has on water quality inﬂuences the socially
optimal ﬁsheries substantially. The stronger this effect is, the less emphasis the
optimal eutrophication management puts on phosphorus removal in ﬁsh tissue and
the more emphasis it puts on keeping the stock permanently at a low level. Second,
the price of the ﬁsh affects the optimal allocation of efforts between ﬁsheries and
external phosphorus abatement. Furthermore, the price changes affect the social
welfare differently depending on the structure of the ﬁsheries. With suitable prices,
open access may generate escapement levels that are below the biologically
MSY — and these might be the socially desired escapement levels for ﬁsh species
with negative water quality effects.
Our analysis shows that ﬁsheries should be a part of efﬁcient water quality
management under a wide variety of conditions. In addition to traditional envi-
ronmental policies, our results might have implications on regulatory systems such
as nutrient trading schemes. It would be interesting to analyze if ﬁsheries of some
non-commercial species could be made part of some existing scheme, such as the
Chesapeake Bay nutrient trading program. This would require establishing the
ecosystem effects of the species in question.11 In the Baltic Sea, an EU-funded
project analyzes possibilities to develop and utilize some form of nutrient trad-
ing.12 The development project includes a pilot that allocates funds for harvesting
cyprinid species. Could cyprinid ﬁsh landings be used as nutrient credit offsets in
future trading platforms?
11The Chesapeake Bay Foundation has already allocated funds to restore oyster population. Oysters
have direct ecosystem beneﬁts, and nutrients are removed from the system as they are being har-
vested. See http://www.cbf.org/how-we-save-the-bay/through-restoration for restoration efforts and
https://www.epa.gov/chesapeake-bay-tmdl/trading-and-offsets-chesapeake-bay-watershed for the
trading program.
12http://nutritradebaltic.eu/
The Role of Fisheries in Optimal Eutrophication Management
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Our research also opens up interesting avenues for further research. The in-
tensity of optimal ﬁshing efforts depends crucially on the effect ﬁsh stocks have on
water quality via the food web. Changes in the ﬁsh stock change the amount and
structure of the grazing pressure on the zooplankton and benthic fauna, the bio-
turbation that the ﬁsh cause to sediments, and the excretion rate per biomass unit.
All these factors affect nutrient release from sediments, the bioavailability of
nutrients to phytoplankton, and the biomass of zooplankton, all of which may
restrict the biomass and affect the composition of phytoplankton. These processes
may take place simultaneously and have mutually synergistic or antagonistic
effects, which makes the net effect difﬁcult to evaluate. It would be an important
extension of the model to explicitly account for these effects.
The model could be modiﬁed to cover uncertainty. In our speciﬁcation the
cyprinid ﬁsh stock may have a direct effect on the level of algae in the water. One
might ask: How do the probability distributions change with cyprinid ﬁsh stocks?
Which one is more resilient: a waterbody with higher nutrient concentrations, a
lower cyprinid ﬁsh stock and higher amount of zooplankton; or one with a lower
nutrient concentration, a higher cyprinid ﬁsh stock and thus a lower amount of
zooplankton?
We used a single dimensional and linear damage function which was based on
estimates of the values of hypothetical improvements in water quality. Future
studies can show whether, as we have assumed here, the marginal beneﬁt of water
quality improvement can represent the marginal damage from quality deterioration.
In addition, the results from future valuation studies may help to allow for a more
responsive, non-linear damage function.
The model could also be extended to multiple age or size-classes to account for
the differences in the effects ﬁsh individuals of different sizes have on water
quality. As seen from the theoretical model the ﬁsh stock dynamics play a central
role in our model. Harvesting cyprinid ﬁsh removes the largest ﬁsh in the popu-
lation. With two age groups, young and old, focusing on the old could temporarily
increase the population of young (due to decreased competition for resources). It
has been suggested that small cyprinid ﬁsh have a more harmful effect on eco-
systems than large ones. They are more effective in eating zooplankton and may
also contribute more strongly to the release of phosphates from the sediments.
Hence, we would need two parameters with !small > !large. However, the costs of
harvesting smaller ﬁsh are higher, that is, γsmall > γlarge. How would this change the
optimal policy? Obviously, this depends on the costs of ﬁsheries.
Finally, an analysis of economic instruments would be useful. How should
existing ﬁsheries be incentivized to harvest a given species that has no, or only
little, market value? Optimal eutrophication management requires taking into
A. Iho et al.
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account the removal of phosphorus as well as the effect the ﬁsh stock has on water
quality. If the latter effect is negative and substantial, how can the society incen-
tivize ﬁshers to keep the stocks at low levels permanently even though the same
harvesting levels would be less costly to obtain with higher stock levels? The fact
that ﬁsh landings are observable but ﬁsh stocks are not makes this an interesting
example of regulation under asymmetric information.
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Appendix A
A.1. Social optimum
For the social planner, the shadow prices of the phosphorus stock and the ﬁsh stock
are denoted by QðX,QÞ and XðX,QÞ. Also, let S and z be Kuhn–Tucker multi-
pliers associated with the constraints on the control variables S and z, respectively.
The (S, zÞ and (S,zÞ have to satisfy the complementary slackness conditions
St  Xt; S, t  0; St < Xt ) S, t ¼ 0,
zt  0; z, t  0; zt > 0 ) z, t ¼ 0:
The complementary slackness conditions stipulate that at the steady state optimum,
the escapement cannot exceed the stock size (St  XtÞ, the current and future reward
from an increase inﬁsh stockmust be less than equal to zero (S, t  0Þ and that if the
ﬁshing effort is positive (St < XtÞ, the optimal escapement is found where their
marginal effect on current and future rewards is zero. Likewise, the external abate-
ment must be non-negative; and if it is positive, its optimal level is found where its
marginal effect on welfare (current and discounted future) is zero. The optimality
conditions are:
pþ γ
S
þ βQ þ βXF 0 Sð Þ ¼ S,
αz βQ ¼ z,
DQ þ βð1 ÞQ ¼ Q,
p γ
X
 DX  βQ þmaxðS, 0Þ ¼ X ,
where DQ and DX are the partial derivatives of the damage function.
The Role of Fisheries in Optimal Eutrophication Management
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Assuming a positive optimal abatement and escapement levels (and thus z ¼
S ¼ 0Þ and rearranging we get
Q ¼
DQ
1 βð1 Þ ,
X ¼ p
γ
X
 DX þ β
DQ
1 βð1 Þ ,
z ¼ β
α
DQ
1 βð1 Þ ,
p γ
S
¼ βF 0ðSÞ p γ
X
 
 DX
h i
 βð1 βF
0ðSÞÞ
1 βð1 Þ DQ:
A.2. Fish population growth
Our approximations ofﬁsh population growth as well as of the costs ofﬁshing (γÞ are
based on the data from a pilot project involving targeted ﬁshery which ran from 2010
to 2011 in the Finnish Archipelago Sea and Gulf of Finland (Setälä et al. 2012). In
particular, we use data fromMynälahti. We consider one representative cyprinid ﬁsh,
combining data on bream and roach catches. The logistic growth function 3 is based
on ﬁsh biomass without age classes. According to Setälä et al. (2012), the estimated
biomass of cyprinid ﬁsh was approximately 1,284 tons in Mynälahti in the spring
2011 and we use this ﬁgure as an estimate for the stock. We assume that the cyprinid
ﬁsh stock was in the steady state before the project. The average annual harvest
between 1980 and 2009 was 63 tons (see Table A.1).13 During the pilot project, the
harvest of cyprinid ﬁsh in Mynälahti was 126 tons in 2010 and 129 tons in 2011.
There were 103 ﬁshers participating in the pilot project. The escapement levels
were approximately 1,270 tons, 1,207 tons and 1,155 tons in 2009, 2010 and 2011,
Table A.1. Stocks and Harvests of Cyprinid Fish in Mynälahti
(tons). Growth Function Parameters: K ¼ 1,500, r ¼ 0.325
Year ðtÞ Stock ðXtÞ Harvest ðXt  StÞ Escapement ðStÞ
1980–2009 1,333 63 1,270
2010 1,333 126 1,207
2011 1,284 129 1,155
13Database of the Finnish Game and Fisheries Research Institute.
A. Iho et al.
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respectively. There are inﬁnitely many pairs of parameters K and r in Eq. (3) that
would generate such escapement levels. To determine reasonable values, we have to
ﬁx eitherK or r after which the other value can be determined from the data. Based on
the expert assessment, we set K ¼ 1,500 which ﬁxes the growth rate at r ¼ 0.325.
A.3. Costs of ﬁsheries
The costs of targeted ﬁsheries (γÞ comprise variable costs such as the costs of labor,
fuel, operation and maintenance. We apply the condition of open-access ﬁshery
where ﬁshers harvest until marginal revenue equals marginal costs: p ¼ γS.
The price of cyprinid ﬁsh has been around 300 EUR/ton (i.e., 0.3 EUR/kg), but
during the pilot project (2010–2011) the ﬁshers were paid 400 EUR/ton. Before
2010 the catch of cyprinid ﬁsh was mainly bycatch of other ﬁsheries. Because the
pilot started midway through the 2010 harvesting season, our numerical simula-
tions use approximations for 2011. Thus, p ¼ 400EUR/ton and γ ¼ pSj2011 
460,000.
A.4. Phosphorus concentrations, food web and water quality
We have long-term data on phosphorus loading, phosphorus concentrations in the
bay and annual ﬁsheries landings.14 We calibrate the unknown parameter  and the
baseline loading q in Eq. (2) using these data. The data leave room for interpre-
tation: for instance, the magnitude of phosphorus transfer between the bay and the
open sea as well as from and to bottom sediments is uncertain. The values of these
two parameters inﬂuence how quickly and strongly the water quality responds to
changes in external loading and ﬁsheries.
The average riverine phosphorus loading to Mynälahti was about 15.1 tons
between 1975 and 2012.15 Phosphorus has been removed from the bay through
ﬁsh landings. The average amounts (and phosphorus concentrations of the asso-
ciated ﬁsh species according to Mäkinen (2008)) during the last three decades have
been the following: perch, 179 tons (phosphorus concentration 1.1%); pike, 32
tons (0.66%); pike-perch, 53 tons (0.8%); burbot, 30 tons (0.43%); roach, 35 tons
(0.8%) and bream, 28 tons (0.7%). There is also a signiﬁcant herring catch in the
bay (5,529 tons) but as it is a migratory ﬁsh, we make the assumption that only
15% of the phosphorus in the ﬁsh originates from the bay. The estimated total of
phosphorus removal from the bay annually by ﬁsheries is thus some 6.5 tons.
14Nutrient loads and concentrations in rivers and in the bay are based on data of the Finnish
Environmental Center.
15Observations from eight years are missing during this period.
The Role of Fisheries in Optimal Eutrophication Management
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Using the phosphorus concentrations of the cyprinid ﬁsh in (Mäkinen 2008) yields
the parameter value  ¼ 0:0075 in Eq. (2).
The baseline phosphorus loading in tons is the net input, that is, the difference
of the riverine loadings and phosphorus removed by the ﬁsheries (other than the
quantity in cyprinid ﬁsh which enters the equation separately). The parameter for
baseline loading in Eq. (2) becomes q ¼ 8:6. The parameter  in (2) captures all
other phenomena affecting the phosphorus balance, the most signiﬁcant of which
are inﬂow and outﬂow from the bay, sedimentation and benthic phosphorus re-
lease. Rather than capturing a single physical phenomenon within the water eco-
system, the parameter has a statistical interpretation. It is calibrated at  ¼ 0:89, a
level that holds the phosphorus concentration at its long-term average level with
the baseline loading and ﬁsheries. If, for instance, the total catch decreased by
10%, 20% or 30%, the long-run phosphorus concentration would end up being
39g=L, 42g=L and 45g=L, respectively. That is, the existing ﬁsheries do play
a role in controlling the water quality.
A.5. Costs of abatement
Mynälahti receives mainly non-point loading from the rivers Puttaanjoki, Laajoki
and Mynäjoki. The ﬁeld acreage of the basin is about 17.7 thousand hectares
(about 20% of the total area of the basin). We assume that 70% of the phosphorus
loading originates from agriculture (ELY Southwest Finland 2011). Based on this
and the loading data, the total phosphorus loading entering the bay, that originates
from agriculture is 10.6 tons. The average effective phosphorus loading is thus
about 0.7 kg/ha, which is slightly lower than the usual estimate for agriculture. For
the cost-efﬁciency analysis we must use the loading values at the receptor point,
thus acknowledging the natural retention caused by the forests, wetlands and lakes
in the basin. We assume that the loading intensity per hectare varies according to
the soil test phosphorus distribution as quantiﬁed in (Iho et al. 2014). Hence, the
10% of the ﬁelds that pollute the least have an annual effective phosphorus loading
of 0.23 kg/ha, and the 10% that pollute the most, 1.2 kg/ha.
It is not straightforward to determine the costs of measures to mitigate phos-
phorus loading from agriculture. Erosion control measures such as no-till reduce
the loading of particulate phosphorus but simultaneously increase the loading of
dissolved phosphorus (McDowell and McGregor 1984; Puustinen et al. 2005).
Accumulated soil phosphorus is a reliable proxy for dissolved phosphorus loads,
but estimating the costs of soil phosphorus depletion is a complex undertaking (see
e.g., Iho and Laukkanen 2012b). One of the few measures with readily identiﬁable
costs and straightforward results is spreading gypsum and we have opted to use it
A. Iho et al.
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as our representative abatement method. We assume that half of the phosphorus
load is in dissolved and half in particulate form. On this basis we calculate that the
load reduction that can be achieved with gypsum treatment is 43% (Ekholm et al.
2012). The annualized per hectare cost is EUR 73 (Iho and Laukkanen 2012a).
This yields the proﬁt function for agriculture, that is, the abatement cost function:
a ¼ 
1
2
αz2 ¼ 56,800z2,
where z  0 is abatement in tons and hence α ¼ 113,600. The marginal abatement
cost after the ﬁrst ton of phosphorus is about 114 EUR/kg, followed by 227 EUR/
kg, 340 EUR/kg, 454 EUR/kg, 568 EUR/kg, etc. for subsequent tons reduced.
A.6. Value of environmental damage
The parameter for the value of environmental damages captures the fact that clean
waters are appreciated by society. As water quality is not traded in the markets, the
monetary value of environmental damage (or beneﬁt) from changes in water
quality has to be estimated using non-market valuation methods. We use the
phosphorus stock of the water column converted to water clarity as an indicator of
water quality. The damage function (6), which maps water quality damages in
monetary terms builds on Finnish value estimates from two choice experiment
studies (Kosenius 2010; Ahtiainen et al. 2014). Table A.2 describes the interpre-
tation of water quality based on these studies in relation to the general usability
classiﬁcation presented in (SYKE 2005).
Table A.2. Water Quality Levels in the Two Valuation Studies and the Usability Index for Sea
Waters. WTP Values in Year 2013 Euros
Water Usability
Classiﬁcation
Total
P gL
  Water
Clarity (m)
Perceived Water Clarity
at One Meter Depth
(Kosenius 2010)
Water Clarity
(Ahtiainen et al. 2014)
Excellent < 12 > 2.5 The bottom is visible from
over 2m in depth
(WTP EUR 137.6)
Good <¼ 20 <¼ 2.5 Clearly visible (WTP EUR
49.0)
The bottom is visible from
one to 2 m in depth
(WTP EUR 83.8)
Satisfactory <¼ 40 < 1 Hardly visible (WTP EUR
24.5)
The bottom is visible from
less than 1 m in depth
(base case)
Passable <¼ 80 Not at all visible (base
case)
Poor > 80
The Role of Fisheries in Optimal Eutrophication Management
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The two valuation studies estimate marginal values for changes in water quality
rather than the total value of the waterbody at a certain water quality level. As the
damage function needs to be anchored to an absolute scale, we assume that damage
in monetary terms at excellent water clarity is zero on the ﬁve-step quality scale.
The value estimates presented in (Kosenius 2010) and (Ahtiainen et al. 2014) are
then inverted to represent damages, that is, good water clarity indicates less
damage than satisfactory water clarity. When value estimates overlap we have
assumed an average marginal change in willingness to pay (WTP) across the two
studies. Based on these values, we then make a linear approximation of the damage
function from known points to worse quality levels, that is, passable and poor
quality, which represent very low usability of the waterbody for any purpose. Thus,
we assume that the marginal beneﬁt of water quality improvement can be inverted
to represent the marginal damage from deterioration in quality and that the values
for damage follow a linear slope. Studies have found that water quality may exhibit
diminishing marginal value for improvements (e.g., Artell 2014). Our linearity
assumption on the marginal values thus leads to conservative value estimates for
improvements in poor quality areas.
We establish a simple correspondence between the usability classiﬁcation, total
phosphorus and the stock of cyprinid ﬁsh. Water quality is expressed as a scalar
value, with 0 representing excellent quality and 4 (or above) poor. This scale
corresponds to the general usability classiﬁcation used in Finland until 2008,
before the implementation of the Water Framework Directive.16
There is a clear logarithmic correspondence between total phosphorus con-
centration ðQÞ in brackish water and the usability classiﬁcation.17 The estimated
parameters for function 6 are  ¼ 2:5 and η ¼ 1:3.18 For the base case, we
assume that ! ¼ 1 and that the direct inﬂuence attainable with ﬁsh stock control is
equal to one. That is, with maximum stock control, the water quality can be
improved from poor to passable, from passable to satisfactory, and so on.
The water quality in Mynälahti is classiﬁed as passable, the second poorest in
the ﬁve-step classiﬁcation. In addition to classiﬁcation, the total value of damage
depends on the number of people affected by shortcomings in water quality. Here,
we make the assumption that preferences used in calculating the original, national
value estimates also represent the target area population. The marginal damage per
person becomes approximately EUR 46 (in year 2013 value). It is based on the
16The questionnaires on which the valuation estimates are based used the general usability
classiﬁcation.
17The value, phosphorus concentration (class mean values) pairs are (6,0); (16,1); (30,2); (60,3) and
(130,4).
18R2 ¼ 0.99.
A. Iho et al.
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marginal values for water clarity changes estimated in (Ahtiainen et al. 2014) and
(Kosenius 2010).
According to the Finnish national outdoor recreation demand and supply in-
ventory data, 90% of all water related recreational trips were made within a range
of 70 km and 49% within 10 km of home (Pouta and Sievänen 2001). Using GIS
techniques with Statistics Finland’s 2010 Grid Database, we estimate that there are
more than half a million people permanently residing within the range of 70 km of
the midpoint of the bay. However, there is a wide range of substitutes for water-
based recreational activities in this region. Using the entire population would
grossly overestimate the value of water quality improvements in Mynälahti alone.
For our base case, we use the distance of 10 km, which given the large size of the
bay itself, is a robust lower limit for the size of the affected population. The
estimate yields 6,900 permanent inhabitants. We calculate the results for alternative
distances in our sensitivity analysis. Hence, the marginal damage parameter in
6 becomes  ¼ 317,400.
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